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Abstract. 
 
The sugar industry in the colony of Queensland (Australia) began in the late 1800s, 
initially following the plantation model. Since slavery had been abolished, and it was 
believed that white men were incapable of working in the tropics, a number of sugar 
entrepreneurs recruited South Sea islanders to provide the labour necessary for 
clearing the dense tropical vegetation and establishing cane growing as an 
economically viable industry. It is estimated that from the early 1860s until 1904, 
over 60,000 islanders were recruited from more than eighty islands to work as 
indentured labourers. In spite of their huge contribution to the sugar industry, 
however, they were never really wanted in Australia, and in the late 1800s, various 
laws were passed which at first protected, then restricted, and finally required their 
deportation.  
 
It was against this backdrop of colonial culture, indentured labour, a struggling 
young sugar industry, the growth of trade unions, and the movement that led to 
Federation and a White Australia Policy in 1901, that the Colonial Sugar Refining 
(CSR) Company established its plantation and sugar mill at Goondi (North 
Queensland) in the 1880s. Driven by a desire to maximise profits and maintain 
healthy dividends, the CSR directors saw the use of indentured labourers as a purely 
economic matter. Political factors such as the breakdown of the plantation system, 
and the restriction on the use of South Sea islanders had to be balanced in the 
management of their sugar plantations and mills in order to maintain profitability.  
 
To this end, the accounting employed at Goondi Mill focused heavily on recording 
and controlling costs, with a high level of accountability required of the mill manager 
in all aspects of the mill’s operations. The low wages paid to indentured labourers 
were a vital factor in maintaining profits, and the recruiting and management of this 
labour force was a constant and demanding task. The recording of islanders not as 
individuals, but as a group, whose wages were kept very low to serve the purposes of 
CSR’s investors, exposes the entrenchment of racist attitudes and class structures 
through indentured labour. It illustrates the reality that accounting operates within an 
institutional setting, usually an unquestioned and unchallenged reflection of the 
opinions and values of the day, and of the power of various interest groups. Reflection 
on accounting history enables us, as accountants, to consider what practices were are 
taking for granted and leaving unchallenged in our times.  
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The South Sea Islanders were forced from the beginning to live outside of 
mainstream Australia. At no stage were they wanted as long-term settlers 
and potential citizens. Sugar growers wanted cheap labour and city-based 
liberals did not want to fraternise with what they believed to be an 
“inferior black race”. The trade union movement felt threatened by the 
abusive employment of the Kanakas1 since they appeared to undermine 
the working conditions of the white population. Voices of dissent on moral 
grounds among people with humanitarian or religious concerns were few 
(Brändle, 2001, p. 37).  
1. Introduction. 
The colony of Queensland separated from New South Wales in 18592, and was then 
preoccupied with “finding cheap and reliable labour to clear and develop its coastal 
land”, the critical problem being “lack of manpower” (Barker and Byford, 1988, p. 
74). In a climate where sugar was “agriculturally appropriate”, at a point in history 
when it was “a good economic prospect”3 (Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 1), and in an 
era when Britain was the dominating influence in the Pacific (Moore, 1993, p. 183), it 
was perhaps not surprising that the plantation system would be the dominant structure 
for Queensland’s early sugar industry in the second half of the 19th century4.  
Since Britain had abolished the slave trade, plantation owners turned to indentured 
labourers to meet their labour needs, recruiting Pacific Islanders at their own expense, 
and transporting them to Queensland. It is estimated that in the years 1863 – 1904, 
some 62,500 Islanders were brought from more than eighty islands (The Call for 
Recognition, 1992, p. 73)5 to work on Queensland sugar plantations. Since these 
islanders performed all the field work connected with the sugar industry, it is probable 
that without them, “the initial enterprise should not have been forthcoming”, and 
“very few of the old mills and plantations should have seen the light of day” 
(NBAC/Z303, 1929). 
In order to stimulate expansion, in 1864 the Queensland government passed the Sugar 
and Coffee Regulations (Frost, 1996, p. 135) and released “large slabs of land” for 
cane growing (Barker and Byford, 1988, p. 72), with the result that the area under 
sugar cane expanded from 1,995 acres in 1867 to 28,026 acres in 1881, the quantity of 
sugar produced in that time increasing from 168 tons to 19,051 tons (NBAC/Z303, 
1882). This production was able to satisfy the “domestic consumption requirements of 
the colony” (of Queensland) and provide sufficient to export, “primarily to Victoria 
and New South Wales” (Shlomowitz, 1979, pp 96 – 97). While plantation owners and 
                                                 
1 The term “Kanakas” was a “term of derision used by white Australians to describe South Sea Island 
labourers” (Berry, 2000, p. 111). It is now not used and will not be used in this paper except when 
referring to original documents of the day when the name was used, or in a direct quotation.  
2 The new colony was proclaimed on 10th December 1859 (Gott, 1997, p. 14). 
3 The American Civil War (1861 – 1865) caused a “serious disruption” to American sugar production 
and hence the European market was looking elsewhere for supply of what had become a “staple food” 
(Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 1). 
4 The plantation system was unique to Queensland, in the Australian context, having a “physical 
environment in which large-scale tropical agriculture could produce an export staple” (Saunders, 1982, 
p. 40).  
5 This figure includes those who re-enlisted at the end of their three year term of indenture (The Call 
for Recognition, 1992, p. 73). Estimates vary, some writers quoting 62,000 (Andrew and Cook, 2000, 
p. 1) or 60,000 (Barker and Byford, 1988, p. 74). Islands from which they were recruited included 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and Tuvalu (The Call for 
Recognition, 1992, p. 73). 
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their managers provided the finance and the impetus behind this remarkable growth, it 
was “based firmly on the broad backs of the many Pacific Islanders who were 
employed to toil in the fields” (Barker and Byford, 1988, p. 73). Since developing the 
resources of the colony was a high priority, the Queensland government was “very 
much in sympathy” with the aims of the sugar entrepreneurs, and “welcomed the 
action of these men who at their own expense had brought laborers from the Pacific 
islands” (Parnaby, 1964, p. 56). It seems that “economic expediency triumphed over 
racial antipathy” (Saunders, 1982, p. 44). 
Captain Robert Towns indentured 67 male Islanders to Beaudesert in 1863 to work on 
his cotton plantation, but the cotton industry struggled, and in 1865, Captain Louis 
Hope recruited 33 Islanders for his sugar plantation at Ormiston, near Brisbane 
(Barker and Byford, 1988, p. 74). Thus began a system of indentured labour in the 
sugar industry6 that opponents described as “slavery”, “temporary slavery”7 or 
“blackbirding”8 (Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 1; The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 
74), and which was tarnished by abuses such as kidnapping9 (Andrew and Cook, 
2000, p. 1; The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 75), mistreatment10, political activism 
associated with racism11, and legislation12, including the “White Australia” policy 
which saw the eventual deportation of Islanders by 1907: 
The South Sea Islanders did most of the back-breaking work to establish 
the Queensland sugar industry, but were never really wanted in the 
Colony of Queensland. During the 1800s there was continuing tension 
between the sugar growers, represented by the Conservative Party, who 
wanted cheap labour and others, represented by the city-based Liberal 
Party, who did not want the colony corrupted by an allegedly ‘inferior 
black race’ (The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 73). 
The Queensland sugar industry underwent massive institutional change in the latter 
part of the 1800s and into the early 1900s, as large “vertically integrated” plantations 
were broken up and small farms were established, owned or leased by European 
farmers. This change occurred alongside the phasing out of indentured Islander labour 
                                                 
6 While indentured labour may not have been slavery, it was not free labour either: “indenture in the 
Pacific was applied cross-culturally, involving large scale circular migration of indigenous peoples 
bonded under the European legal system and harnessed to the development of commercial agriculture 
and mining” (Moore, 1993, p. 183). 
7 This “temporary slavery” was not just cheap but guaranteed for three years, “thus removing 
uncertainty in labour supply from plantation owners” (The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 78). 
8 It was doubtful whether Islanders understood the contracts they signed, in spite of the fact that 
government agents were supposed to ensure that Islanders came “voluntarily” (Barker and Byford, 
1988, p. 74).  
9 Historians suggest that 25 – 30% of recruitments were “in varying degrees illegal, though probably 
less than 5% would have been kidnapped”, mostly before the tightening of regulations in the 1880s 
(The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 75). 
10 Often “coercion and brutality triumphed over moral persuasion and kindness – and this was tacitly 
recognized in the legal system” (Evans et al, 1975, p. 193). Even if this kind of mistreatment did not 
occur, “conditions on the plantations and farms were often difficult, and given that the labourers came 
from pre-capitalist societies and had little prior contact with the world beyond their islands, the first 
years of their indenture contracts could be quite traumatic” (Moore, 1993, p. 185). 
11 The labour movement, particularly the AWU (Australian Workers’ Union) was “a vehement 
opponent of the South Sea Islanders, who were refused membership along with other non-Europeans” 
(The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 21). 
12 Appendix 1 “Queensland and Commonwealth legislation relating to the employment of Pacific 
Islanders” summarizes significant Queensland and Commonwealth legislation relating to the 
employment of Pacific Islanders and related sugar industry matters.  
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and the exclusion of all Melanesian and Asian labour from the industry (Shlomowitz, 
1979, p. 93). Carnegie (1997) highlighted two influences on pastoral accounting in 
Australia at this time, which are equally applicable to accounting in the sugar 
industry: the impact of corporate business structures on the notion of accountability 
and the reality of colonialism13, when the “educational, legal and politicial, and 
economic systems in the six British colonies in Australia were broadly based on those 
prevailing in Britain” (Carnegie, 1997, p. 19).  
This author acknowledges that the practice of accounting is conducted within an 
institutional structure (Irvine, 2002), and that that structure “has changed over time” 
(Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 23). Further, accounting, “as a set of beliefs and 
techniques”, has the ability to “link actions and values, i.e. to make those actions 
legitimate” (Richardson, 1987, p. 341). It can be “a means of sustaining and 
legitimising the current social, economic and political arrangements” (Cooper, 1980, 
p. 164), as has been illustrated by Funnell (1998), in his analysis of the use of 
accounting to further the racist policies of the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s.  Kim 
(2004, p. 96), identified two paths that were followed in colonial settings in order to 
“meet the growing need of capitalism in Europe”. These were “the incorporation of 
indigenous populations into the colonial capitalist system by colonizing the land” and 
“the importation of people from different parts of the world into the new colonies as a 
cheap labour source under the labour contract” (Kim, 2004, pp. 96 – 97). Prevailing 
institutionalised racist attitudes developed, she maintained, in two ways: 
On the one hand, in times of the expansion of the capitalist mode of production, 
when cheap labour was most needed, labour immigration was condoned by the 
imperialist regime in order to meet the needs of capital. On the other hand, in 
times of economic downturn, labour migration was condemned as a socio-
economic threat to society (Kim, 2004, p. 97).  
This study is thus not a “technical” history14, but a study grounded on the belief that 
accounting plays a powerful role in the transmission of societal values. Because this 
paper focuses on accounting for South Sea Islander labour at the Goondi Plantation 
and Mill in north Queensland in the late 1800s in its institutional context, the political 
events of the time will be considered, as well as the accounting practices employed by 
the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd (the owner of the plantation and mill), and 
the way those practices reflected societal values and corporate culture.  
First, an introduction to the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. is provided, 
which highlights the company’s expansionary vision into North Queensland, 
illustrated by the establishment of the Goondi plantation and mill, its system of 
accountability, and its consistency in maintaining dividends for its shareholders. 
Queensland legislation about South Sea Islanders is crucial to an understanding of the 
sugar industry at that time, so that is summarised briefly, together with practices of 
employment of indentured labour and public opinion on the issue. This is followed by 
a description of the use of South Sea Islander labour at the Goondi Plantation and Mill 
in the context of CSR’s desire to maintain a steady supply of cheap labour. With a 
                                                 
13 Neu (2000) gave visibility to the role of accounting in the “(re)production of colonialism” in Canada. 
In the case of Queensland’s sugar industry, the colonial influence was “determined”, as north-eastern 
Australia was progressively occupied and agricultural and business interests expanded through the 
exploitation of Pacific Islanders (Hopkins-Weise, 2002, p. 49).  
14 Hopwood (1985, p. 365), cited by Napier (2001, p. 20), described technical histories of accounting as 
those which were written “in isolation of their social, economic and institutional contexts”, and where 
accounting was “abstracted from its social domain”.  
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picture of the institutional environment of the day painted, various examples of 
accounting from the Goondi Mill are then provided. They illustrate CSR’s drive to 
make the operation profitable, and the accountability they, as the corporate owner, 
demanded of that operation. Conclusions are then drawn about accounting’s role in 
maintaining current institutional practices.  
2. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. 
The Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR) Company was formed in 1855 with an initial 
capital of £150,000 (NBAC/142/3527), to take over the assets of the Australasian 
Sugar Company, whose director Edward Knox, became a director of the new 
company. Other shareholders were Edwin Tooth, a brewer, and Walter Lamb and 
Daniel Cooper, both merchants (Griggs, 2001, p. 363). Two years later, the Victoria 
Sugar Company was formed, half owned by shareholders in CSR, and in addition to 
its other investments in plantations, sugar mills and refineries, the company bought 
three sugar plantations in north Queensland in the 1870s at a cost of £600,000. In 
1888, when the Victorian company was failing, the two companies amalgamated, and 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited was formed (Griggs, 2001, p. 364; South 
Pacific Enterprise, 1956, p. 405). The key factors that contributed to the company’s 
sustained success in the sugar industry seem to have been an obvious commitment to 
maintaining a substantial dividend, a vision for strategic investment in the sugar 
industry, and a strong emphasis on accountability. 
A study of the accounts of CSR in the latter part of the 1800s makes it very clear that 
agriculture was big business. Just as the southern plantations in the United States were 
not “crude business operations” (Heier, 1988, p. 132), neither were the operations of 
CSR. Its survival, expansion, and domination of the Australian sugar industry through 
extremely turbulent times, both economically and politically, indicate a high level of 
business acumen and sophistication15. In the plantation era, CSR was able to enjoy 
some economies of scale in “borrowing funds, in purchasing supplies and indentured 
labour, in training indentured labour, through the gang system of organizing labour, in 
supervision of indentured labour, in transport indivisibilities, in milling 
indivisibilities, and in marketing sugar” (Shlomowitz, 1979, p. 100). The company 
managed this with great success, initially increasing profits and maintaining a steady 
dividend to shareholders, as portrayed in Figure 1 “Dividends 1888 – 1898” below.  
                                                 
15 An editorial in The Sugar Journal and Tropical Cultivator (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894a) dated July 15, 
1894, observed of CSR: “from a single refinery, treating about a thousand tons of sugar per year, to the 
present giant undertaking dealing with one hundred times that amount, and making in mills in 
Queensland, New South Wales, and Fiji, sixty thousand tons of raw sugar annually, is a stride not 
easily grasped without reflection … wherever it has started operations it has practically secured a 
monopoly … as with its employees so with the farmers tenanting its estates, the company is having no 
trouble. It recognizes the necessity of both, and as long as its capital secures a fairly remunerative 
return, the management wisely refrains from attempting to increase its profit at the expense of those 
who work … the result of its work is seen in its balance sheets, which regularly disclose handsome 
profits and enable ample provision to be made for the proverbial rainy day”.  CSR’s position within the 
Australian sugar industry in the late 1800s was described as “unrivalled” (Saunders, 1982, p. 53).  
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Figure 1. CSR Dividends 1888 – 1898 
(Source: NBAC/142/3527) 
While profits decreased and levelled out from the mid 1890s onward, the company 
pursued an aggressive policy of increasing dividends from 6% in 1887 to 10% in 
189116, and maintained them at that level through the rest of the 1890s 
(NBAC/142/3527). At the same time, a dividend equalization reserve was established 
in 1889 with an initial transfer of £30,000, was increased to £165,000 in 1894, and 
was maintained at that level into the twentieth century, thus assuring shareholders of a 
constant stream of income even if profits decreased. They did fall off in the late 
1890s, levelling out to a size where they just managed to cover the dividends during 
what was a very turbulent period. 
Even as the plantation system broke down, the Queensland government legislated to 
cease the importation of South Sea Islander labourers, and the sugar industry went 
into a major depression (around 1890), the company strategically dealt with the issues 
of the day, and ensured the profitability of its various enterprises, to the extent that it 
continued to dominate sugar production in Australia for decades, all the while 
maintaining dividends, as demonstrated in Figure 1. The directors reported to 
shareholders, in their report for the half year ended 31st March 1889, when the 
projected result fell short by 30%, that it had been “the most disastrous year for sugar 
planters yet experienced, the make in Queensland alone having declined from 58,000 
tons in 1887 to 28,000 tons in 1888”17 (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1899). The 
                                                 
16 The new chairman Mr Thomas Buckland reported to shareholders “the increase in the dividend will 
be welcome to the proprietors; and lest it should be thought that this increase was due to my being 
more inclined than my predecessor to distribute the profits made, I would point out that we are able at 
the same time to maintain our conservative policy in regard to our dealings with the profits by adding a 
substantial sum to Dividend Reserve” (Note: an amount of £25,000 was added to the reserve at that 
time) (NBAC/142/3527). 
17 Shlomowitz (1979, p. 101) described the years 1885 – 1891 as “calamitous for the sugar industry”, 
when the world price of the commodity fell by a third due to the dumping on the internal market of 
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director’s report for that six-month period highlighted the issues that the company, 
along with other participants in the sugar industry in Queensland, had to deal with in 
what was becoming an increasingly complex institutional environment. In referring to 
the Queensland Government’s appointment of a Commission to “enquire into the 
cause of the depression in the sugar industry in Queensland” the report stated: 
… the result of that enquiry is unsatisfactory, as tending to maintain that 
feeling of uncertainty which for some time past has oppressed the sugar 
interest in that colony, but good will probably be done by the publication 
of the evidence taken. We think that vested interests will be too strong for 
the introduction of Kanaka labour to cease; but in the meantime no money 
is being spent in extensions, and our labour staff, prior to the 31st 
December, 1890, the date fixed for the cessation of the introduction of 
Kanaka labour, will be brought up to its full strength (NBAC/142/3527, 
31st March 1899). 
Half yearly reports through the 1890s constantly referred to the shifting political 
landscape, and the difficulty of maintaining profitable operations, given the 
Queensland government’s legislation. That legislation first set in place a date for the 
cessation of the use of South Sea island labour, extended that limit, and at the same 
time foreshadowed the breaking up of plantations for sale to local farmers and the 
introduction of tariffs to encourage the use of white labour. Throughout these years, 
directors made strategic decisions about the company’s operations in order to extract 
the greatest profit possible in uncertain times and to preserve the invested capital. The 
employment of South Sea Islander labour was one factor of many they considered: 
The Directors have carefully considered the effect of the stoppage, at the 
end of the present year, of the introduction of Kanaka labourers into 
Queensland, and being convinced that sugar plantations in the tropics 
cannot be worked without coloured labour, they have arranged to test a 
district in Fiji, which presents considerable advantages, with the object of 
providing employment for the plant now in Queensland, when the Mills 
there have to be closed for want of suitable labour … it is proposed to 
remove one of the Mills to Fiji at the end of 1891 (NBAC/142/3527, 31st 
March 1890). 
There now seems no chance of the labour difficulty in Queensland being 
met … (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1890). 
The Queensland Government has introduced a Bill which will allow of the 
acquisition of properties – such as our plantations – by the neighbouring 
settlers … we expect to dispose in this way of the Victoria Mill at a price 
which will return to us the sum to which it has been written down … 
(NBAC/142/3527, 30th September 1891). 
The shareholders will have been pleased to hear that we are again to be 
permitted to employ Kanakas in Queensland, and we are, in consequence, 
arranging to retain there the plant which we proposed to take to Fiji … in 
view of the retention of the third plant in Queensland, machinery is being 
ordered for the new plantation in Fiji …(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 
1892). 
                                                                                                                                            
large quantities of European beet sugar. It stayed like this for the next three decades, with the result that 
the value of plantations dropped dramatically. 
 9
Work is going on well at our new Plantation in Fiji, and in Queensland we 
are gradually disposing of our cultivation lands to tenants who have the 
option of purchase … up to date we have thus disposed of 5,514 acres 
(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1893). 
… the erection of a number of central mills in different localities, with 
funds provided by the Government of Queensland … will probably tend 
to keep down the value of sugars in these colonies after it has recovered 
elsewhere. Australasia can and should produce all the sugar needed for its 
own people; but the labour conditions under which it is made prevent, in 
my opinion, its production at a cost that would permit of its being sold at a 
profit in the European and American markets (NBAC/142/3527, 31st 
March 1895). 
… it will be impossible for the farmer to grow the cane at (a reduced) 
price unless the duty be ₤3 per ton, or unless he employs coloured labour 
to cultivate the cane, and we follow his example in order to reduce the 
cost of cutting the crop. This we will not do. White men can do all the 
work in connection with the cane in this colony; but if the fiscal policy 
prevents their employment we will face the destruction of the industry 
rather than take any part in the introduction of coloured labourers from 
India or elsewhere (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1896). 
The reasonable proposals we made for the maintenance of the industry 
have been rejected by the Government, and it is evident that there is now 
no hope of preventing the sacrifice of this great agricultural and 
manufacturing interest, which has been singled out for destruction, while 
other less important industries remain largely protected (NBAC/142/3527, 
30th September 1896). 
In this Colony we have cancelled the contracts with the farmers who have 
been growing cane for us and we are thus free to close the mills when the 
working of these ceases to be profitable … when the mills are closed we 
shall have to write off about ₤450,000, which amount – as you were 
informed in my remarks at the meeting of shareholders held on the 30th 
April 1896 – we shall be prepared to provide without trenching upon the 
paid-up capital (NBAC/142/3527, 30th September 1897). 
The work of the mills during the season of 1897 has resulted in the 
production of an average crop at a moderate cost, and the Directors have 
reason to hope that the output of this year will be made even more 
cheaply, and will exceed in quantity that of any preceding year 
(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1898). 
CSR’s north Queensland operations provide a specific example of the vision of 
directors in seizing a new profit-making opportunity, and of their business acumen in 
directing its operations. It was in about 1880 that CSR, at the time with a paid-up 
capital of over £11,000,000, “became interested in the sugar industry in Queensland”, 
when a director of CSR, Hon. E. B. Forrest, visited the Johnstone River area in North 
Queensland. In 1882, Charles Edward Adams “set things going at Goondi”18 for the 
                                                 
18 The name “Goondi” was a widely used Aboriginal word meaning “big bend” or “bent elbow”. The 
name was used in a letter from CSR to Mr C E Adams, manager of the plantation, in 1885 (Robertson, 
1991, p. 5). 
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company. In that year, the CSR Board authorised Mr E B Forrest, or Parbury, Lamb 
& Co to acquire 5,000 acres on the Johnstone River (Robertson, 1991, p. 3). At this 
time, “by special Act of Parliament, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Sydney 
was permitted to take up great areas of land in various places, under-taking at the 
same time to spend £200,000 within five years on the clearing and cultivation of that 
land and erection of plant” (Docker, 1970, p. 99). They were not the only investors 
from the south to become alert to the possibilities of investment in North Queensland: 
By 1880, capital was being attracted from Sydney and Melbourne and 
even from overseas. In its flamboyant way, big business ignored such 
minor considerations as the heavy initial costs, and the distance from 
established ports. It was concerned exclusively with the ultimate long-
term prospects as evidenced by the rising world market. It had begun 
setting up operations in quite new parts of Queensland, in places like the 
Burdekin delta, where once only cattle had grazed; the lower Herbert, the 
south Johnstone River … The Colonial Sugar Refining Co., for instance, 
was putting £200,000 into its great Victoria Mill near Ingham. This plant 
was supposed to have everything – electric light, automatic feeding into 
the rollers … (Docker, 1970, p. 173). 
CSR’s Goondi mill, 8 miles upstream from Geraldton (now Innisfail), was one of 
three mills operated by CSR in north Queensland, the others being Victoria on the 
Herbert River and Homebush near Mackay (Robertson, 1991, p. 3). The decision to 
erect a mill at Goondi was made because of the closure of other mills in the district, 
with the result that in 1884, CSR approved the dismantling and transportation of the 
Southgate sugar mill on the Clarence River (northern New South Wales) to the North 
Johnstone river (Robertson, 1891, p. 5). No less was expected of the Goondi 
plantation and mill than was expected of any of CSR’s other business operations: 
profitability was the major emphasis. CSR’s directors, in particular, E W Knox19, paid 
meticulous attention to every detail of its operation. The manager of the mill, C E 
Forster, although separated by distance from CSR’s head office in Sydney, was held 
accountable for the performance at Goondi20, including the quantity and quality of 
cane produced, the cost at which it was produced, and its performance relative to 
other north Queensland mills. Accounting was a vital part of this mechanism of 
accountability, as will be illustrated below, but it did not occur in a vacuum. The 
unique economic and political situation in which the company operated, particularly 
in relation to the employment of indentured labourers from the Pacific islands, had a 
massive effect on the way it conducted its business.  
                                                 
19 Edward W Knox was the son of the founder, Edward Knox. Based in Sydney, he was the General 
Manager of CSR, and when his father returned to England on his retirement in 1891, E W Knox took 
his seat on the Board (NBAC/142/3527, 31 March 1891). His voluminous correspondence with C E 
Forster, the manager of the Goondi mill in the late 1880s, illustrates his thorough knowledge of every 
aspect of the sugar industry, his emphasis on profitability, and the high degree of accountability he 
required of the mill manager (NBAC/142/1456; NBAC/126/92; NBAC/N126/2). 
20 In a letter dated 30th January, 1891, from CSR’s General Manager Staff to Mr Forster, the mill 
manager’s responsibilities were reduced from the management of both Goondi and Victoria mills to 
Goondi mill alone, accompanied by a reduction in salary of £50 per year. The letter encouraged Mr 
Forster to improve his performance: “… trust that you will be able to convince me at the end of the 
year by the results of next season that the blame for the indifferent work in 1890 could not fairly be laid 
at your door” (NBAC/126/92, 30 January 1891). His salary, however, was quite handsome, increasing 
from £345 in 1888 to £445 in 1889 and £550 in 1890 and 1891 (NBAC/Z109/308). 
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3. Political influences and employment practices. 
The recruiting of South Sea Islanders began without official approval21, and there was 
always a great deal of opposition to it, from missionaries, “workingmen”, 
“churchmen” (Irving, 1980, p. 153) and others22. While these objections appeared 
initially to be on the grounds of unfairness to and mistreatment of Islanders23, over the 
next few decades, the reasons for such opposition became more complex and 
occasioned much more political lobbying and controversy, as public opinion moved 
against the Islanders. This prejudice was fuelled by a political push to make Australia 
“white” (part of the Federation impetus), and by pressure from labour unions24 to 
protect white labour from the competition occasioned by Islanders, who received 
substantially lower wages25.  
Appendix 1, “Queensland legislation relating to the employment of South Sea 
Islanders”, summarises relevant legislation over 30 years. Before the passing of 
various Acts relating to South Sea Islanders, the Masters and Servants Act was the 
only one that really covered indentured labourers, and provided for penalties for 
absconders. Specific laws were created to protect Islanders (from 186826), then to 
                                                 
21 The British Colonial Office thought of recruitment of Pacific Islanders “in the same terms as it 
regarded the indenture of (Indian) coolies” (Docker, 1970, p. 13). These workers had been successfully 
employed in West Indies and Mauritius, and that system was intended to be the model for the 
Queensland indentured labour system. However, these plans broke down, and instead, Pacific Islanders 
were brought in as “a substitute labor force” (Parnaby, 1964, p. 49). But there were “very significant 
differences affecting the ability of the Queensland and imperial governments to supervise recruiting 
effectively, and the capacity of the Islander to make a fair contract” (Parnaby, 1964, p. 49), and the 
Imperial Government, which “ felt it had disposed of the question of slavery and slave-dealing many 
years before” (Docker, 1970, p. 13), found itself facing a system that had developed unexpectedly.  
22 The British government, missionaries and the navy strongly objected to “abuses and maltreatment”, 
together with many colonists (Buxton, 1980, p. 201). The missionaries in the islands were, it is 
reported, not impressed by the first legislation to protect Islanders, 1868 Polynesian Labourers’ Act, 
“despite its regulations, appendixes, and attached schedules, forms of agreement to be filled out with 
provision for the signature of witnesses and so on. Such legal apparatus would only serve ‘to legalize 
slavery’, the missionaries thought, ‘to confirm skippers in the practice of kidnapping’” (Docker, 1970, 
p. 54). In spite of the Act, the practice of recruitment was described as “kidnapping without violence” 
(Parnaby, 1964, p. 72). Local ecclesiastics urged people to “regard the kanaka as man and brother”, but 
no, they thought of him as a “black curse” (Pagani, 1989, p. 37). The influential British and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society” campaigned vigorously against ill-treatment of coloured workers (Evans et al, 
1975, pp 160 – 161).  
23 R. B. Sheridan, the Assistant Immigration Officer at Maryborough, stated in 1876 that he had “very 
grave and serious misgivings as to the kind of treatment Polynesians employed on plantations, stations, 
etc., receive from their employers”. He alleged that in two instances he knew of, “Polynesians were 
whipped on different sugar plantations”, and suggested that “some regulations be made for taking the 
evidence of South Sea Islanders, otherwise many offences against them must remain unpunished” 
(Moore, 1974, p. 36). 
24 Labour unions were criticized for their insistence that South Sea Islander labour be abolished: “If the 
Labor vote in Australia is too strong to permit of the development of North Australia, let that vote take 
the responsibility of its own unreason. Compel it to do so ” (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894h, p. 20).  
25 At the time of the passing of the 1884 act which excluded Islanders from anything but agricultural 
labour, it was reported that Pacific Islander labour cost 2/4d per day “including passage money to 
Queensland and back home, charges under acts, wages, maintenance”, compared to white labour which 
dost 5/2d per day. In addition, Islanders worked “longer each day, for more days each year” (Parnaby, 
1964, p. 130). 
26 The British Government pressured the Queensland Government into issuing regulations requiring the 
presence of Government agents on all recruiting vessels (The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 76; Frost, 
1996, p. 133). The Colonial Office had been critical of the system of recruiting.  
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restrict them (1884), and finally to deport them (1885 and 1892). This legislation27 
represented a departure from the British Imperial Government, which held that “like 
the Indian indentured labourer, the Pacific island labourer should have equal rights 
with the local labourer” (Parnaby, 1964, p. 153). The Queensland government, in 
contrast, saw Pacific Islanders as “a temporary and inferior labor supply to whom the 
statutory rights and privileges of European labor did not extend. They were not 
allowed free choice of employment, nor given either adequate legal protection against 
ill treatment, or any limitation on their hours of work” (Parnaby, 1964, p. 153).  
So that this legislation would not signal the doom of the sugar industry, the Sugar 
Works Guarantee Act and the Central Mill Acts put forward an alternative to 
dependence on coloured labour. These acts were passed under the leadership of Sir 
Samuel Griffith, who became premier of Queensland in 188328. Griffith had a vision 
for the future of Queensland as being “peopled by small farmers, yeoman farmers in 
the liberal tradition, men of small capital means, farming their own land with the aid 
of their families and not labouring for others” (Moore, 1974, p. 39). He had “as little 
sympathy with the extreme opponents of Pacific island labor as he had for those who 
wanted Queensland to become another South Carolina” (Parnaby, 1964, p. 102). 
Griffith’s legislation, the Pacific Islander Labourers’ Amendment Act of 1885, which 
required the cessation of recruitment of Islander labour from 1890, was an attempt “to 
rid the colony of the two castes they (the Liberals) so vehemently hated – the group of 
rich planters who were so often absentee landlords and their Melanesian servants, 
kept servile by legislation and social discrimination (Evans et al, 1975, p. 156). This 
strategy sent a shock wave to plantation investors: 
… investors’ confidence was chilled, especially since there was already 
evidence of over-speculation in north Queensland plantations at a time 
when world sugar prices were entering what was to be a twenty-year 
slump (Bolton, 2003, p. 6). 
Support was not as widespread as Griffith had hoped, since “many of the large 
plantations were collapsing from the weight of their overdrafts”, and the 
“smallholders”, on whom Griffith was relying to carry his new policy, “were in their 
turn calling for the restoration of the traffic in Pacific Islanders” (Bolton, 2003, p. 9). 
When the sugar industry fell into a depression, the McIlwraith government29 
appointed a Royal Commission, already referred to, in 1888, to investigate the 
condition of the industry, and to address the issue of whether coloured labour could be 
dispensed with by 189030. It later became apparent to Griffith31 (Bolton, 2003, p. 9) 
that “however much he had been irked by planters in the past, his small farmer policy 
was in jeopardy without a labour supply”, so he extended recruitment of Islanders as a 
“transitional move to allow the sugar industry to carry on while the change to small 
farms and white labour took place” (Manning, 1983, p. 72). These changes 
                                                 
27 Between 1868 and 1912, “eight State and 13 Commonwealth Acts were passed to control and 
eventually stop the importation of islanders as labourers” (Gott, 1997, p. 18).  
28 Griffith swept into power “by an overwhelming majority, proclaimed the champion of ‘White 
Australia’, of the little man, and of much besides” (Docker, 1970, p. 211). 
29 Sir Samuel Griffith’s government was defeated in 1888.  
30 Two of the three commissioners recommended the continuation of coloured labour, ascribing the 
threat by legislation as the cause of the depression in the industry (Parnaby, 1964, p. 137). 
31 Griffith and McIlwraith, previously opposed, formed a coalition government in 1890, described in 
some quarters as “Griffilwraith” (Bolton, 2003, p. xxi).   
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represented a huge shift away from the plantation model and everything it 
represented.  
Two arguments were put forward by plantation owners and managers throughout this 
bitter and protracted debate: the belief that white men simply could not perform 
physical labour in the tropics (Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 1; Robertson, 1991, p. 8), 
and the assertion that the sugar industry would not survive without a reliable pool of 
cheap coloured labour32. The belief that white men could not work in the tropics has 
been described as an almost “axiomatic ‘bridging belief’ to reinforce the cultural 
elevation of Europeans”, and a rationalization “to substantiate the existence of a 
particular social structure wherein Melanesians and other non-Europeans were kept in 
a permanent position of economic and cultural subservience” (Evans et al, 1975, p. 
158). On the opposite side, labour unions were opposed to competition from cheaper 
labour, and racial prejudice emanated from an inherent belief in the superiority of 
white races and the “appalling incidence of disease and death, which afflicted the 
Kanakas and through them the whites”33 (Price, 1939, p. 60). Others concentrated on 
the need for mechanisation as a way of alleviating the political squabbling over the 
coloured labour issue34.  
These views swayed the Australian population into proceeding towards Federation in 
1901 on the understanding that the White Australia policy would be implemented35. A 
letter to the Editor in the Brisbane Courier on 17th December 1881 (NBAC/Z303/, 
1881, p. 7) attempted to convince readers that workers would have nothing to fear 
from coloured labour, based on an understanding that the sugar industry was valuable 
to the colony and required such labour: 
                                                 
32 “White men were neither cheap, reliable nor amenable to discipline like a coloured servant” (Evans 
et al, 1975, p. 159), so the employment of Islander labour eliminated the threat of sudden fluctuations 
in the employment pool of plantation owners.  
33 Reflecting on an average mortality rate of 70.9 per 1,000 Islanders from 1875 to 1878, Price (1939, 
p. 60) observed that “the island continent, which might have remained a protected human laboratory for 
the white races, had opened its doors to malaria, … leprosy, and other forms of tropical disease”. 
Islanders, crowded into inadequate accommodation, with poor hygiene, contracted dysentery, measles, 
whooping cough, tuberculosis and influenza (The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 84). 
34 One subscriber to a sugar journal wrote “the growers have not yet realized the necessity of 
combining together and offering a bonus to the inventor of a practical cane-cutter. Were one half the 
attention paid to the mechanical saving of labor in our mills devoted to the same ends in our fields we 
venture to say that there would soon be no labor question. The number of hands employed would be 
relatively reduced to a point at which neither the interference of the State nor the deliberate opposition 
of organized white labor could materially affect it” (ASIM/SJ/SJTC, 1894g, p. 26).  
 
35 In 1899 over 80% of voters in northern sugar areas supported federation in the referendum, 
indicating an acceptance of the cessation of black labour, but they “still clung to the hope that extensive 
protection would be accorded them prior to expulsion of the Kanakas” (Pagani, 1989, p. 33). Prime 
Minister Barton did offer protection, in the form of a tariff on imported sugar, and a rebate of £2 per 
ton for producers who grew cane with wholly white labour (Pagani, 1989, p. 34). Queensland has been 
described as “tardy” about entering Federation and contemplating its own separate Commonwealth 
(Bolton, 2003, p. xx). It has further been suggested that “the effective resistance of southern 
Queensland, aided by the British government, alone prevented the secession of the northern sugar 
lands” and that “only the paucity and weakness of the north Queensland population and the concessions 
made by southern Australia averted a crisis such as preceded the American Civil War” (Price, 1939, p. 
60). The “great experiment” embarked on upon Federation, of turning the sugar industry into one that 
employed only white workers, was a tremendous challenge, and required that the “Commonwealth 
Government will have to recognise its duties in respect to inducing white labor to take up the work”, 
according to the editor of a sugar journal (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1902, p. 143 ). 
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… irrespective of exclusive European labour proving unremunerative to 
the planter, that class of labour is not capable of undertaking the work, 
and is also unreliable. For instance, I have known of newly-engaged 
European immigrants when working in summer time in the cane rows so 
overcome by heat that they begged their agreements to be cancelled, it 
being impossible for them to continue that work … unless another source 
of cheap labour is opened up, the plantations will be gradually closed, 
which would be a great blow to the colony, there being already a vast 
amount invested in sugar, which in a short time will be counted by 
millions. It is in the interests of the colony that this industry should 
receive encouragement by cheap labour, and every working man who 
studies his own interests should vote for those who advocate coolie labour 
for sugar plantations … it is all nonsense to suppose they could not be 
restricted to sugar plantations. 
Lobbying on the issue was intense. A petition presented to the Legislative Assembly 
of the Colony of Queensland from “Sugar Planters and Farmers and others resident in 
the district of Mackay, interested in the continuance of the sugar industry” asked for 
an extension of the restriction on the use of Islander labour for five years, until 31st 
December 1895, and also employed an economic argument to prove the benefits of 
Polynesian labour: 
 … no valid objection can be raised to the employment of Polynesians for 
Tropical Agriculture on the ground of injustice to Europeans, because the 
whole value of the produce raised from the soil by the employment of 
Polynesians’ labour passes into the pockets of Europeans, every class in 
the community being more or less benefited, also that the wages paid to 
Polynesians are almost wholly spent within the colony, while of the large 
sum of from £700,000 to £800,000 annually spent on the production of 
sugar the 10 per cent spent upon Polynesians enables the remaining 90 per 
cent to be spent on Europeans (NBAC/N126/245, Petition). 
By 1900 the plantation system had almost completely moved to a co-operative 
system, this “democratization of the cane lands” heralding a “new social model” 
(Frost, 1996, p. 138). This huge change formed the political backdrop in which CSR 
operated its Goondi plantation and mill in the late 1800s. As both a recruiter and 
employer of Islanders, it was inevitable that the company would be caught up in the 
intensity of the issue, at both a corporate and a local level.  
4.  South Sea Islander labour at Goondi Plantation and Mill. 
Two observations can be made about CSR’s operations at Goondi from 1882 onwards 
and its use of South Sea Islander labour: first, CSR actively recruited and employed 
non-white labour36 and did all it could to continue the practice until it was clear that 
alternative measures had to be adopted; and secondly, the board viewed the 
employment of Islanders and workers of other ethnicities as an economic matter.  
                                                 
36 In a letter from CSR’s head office to the Goondi mill in 1888 (Robertson, 1991, p. 8), it was 
observed that “in climates like that of the Johnstone, it is impossible for white men to work 
systemically in the cultivation of cane”. 
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From the time of CSR’s arrival at the Johnstone River in 1882, the company was 
actively involved in recruiting Islanders37, chartering the Nautilus, Para and Hector, 
which made regular trips to the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. Eventually, CSR 
purchased the Nautilus, and used it exclusively38 (Robertson, 1991, p. 9). But South 
Sea Islanders were not the only non-white labourers employed by CSR on its sugar 
plantations. From the earliest days Chinese were involved in the industry39, many 
travelling from the goldfields further inland to the coast to take up clearing leases40, 
doing work for CSR that Europeans found difficult. The workforce at Goondi in 1888 
comprised 175 Europeans, 50 Chinese, 70 Aborigines41, 325 Melanesians (The Call 
for Recognition, 1992, p. 81) and 50 others (including Malays and Javanese) (Evans et 
al, 1975, p. 179). All performed clearly defined duties, “allocated on a combination of 
what was socially acceptable and what construed the economic running of the 
Plantation”, and for Europeans, this meant positions as “engineers, store keepers, 
blacksmiths, skilled workers in the mill and as overseers and ploughmen in the 
fields”, with “gangers” supervising up to 30 “Kanaka boys” (Robertson, 1991, p. 8). 
The use of cheap coloured labour was, at that time, seen as essential to the profitable 
running of the operation. Figure 2 “Plantation Structure: Status and Authority” below, 
outlines the line of command, from coloured field labourers at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, to the planter at the top.  
                                                 
37 An 1898 letter from 17 farmers at Goondi (growing cane on land leased or purchased from CSR), 
recorded their undertaking to repay to the company within three years “the whole of the money 
expended in connexion with the introduction, landing & return passages of such labour (Polynesian), 
together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum” (NBAC/N126/121).   
38 The “Nautilus”, owned by CSR, made regular voyages, with a government agent on board to 
supervise recruiting. This was not always seen in a positive light, E W Knox observing to C E Forster, 
the manager of the Goondi mill, in a letter dated 2nd July 1889, that the Nautilus’ last voyage was not 
successful, due to the Captain’s having been very ill, and “the Government agent having apparently 
made up his mind to prevent recruiting as far as possible” (NBAC/142/1456, pp. 109 – 110). 
39 See Poy and Tam Sie, described as “remarkable examples of Chinese assiduity and aptitude for 
business” (NBAC/Z303, 1944, p. 71) came to Innisfail (then known as Geraldton) in 1882 
40 There were two kinds of clearing leases: “one just to clear the land, and the other kind where the 
Chinese could clear the land and then grow cane on it, which CSR would provide. They were paid 9/- 
per ton to deliver trucks to the main line. In 1884 the Chinese cleared 100 acres, then 200 in 1885, until 
by 1889 they had cleared 2500 of the 2700 acres made available to them on the estate. Clearing was 
expensive, costing between £5 and £7/5/- per acre” (Robertson, 1991, p. 4) 
41 An article in The Sugar Journal and Tropical Cultivator (1894, p. 106) observed that aborigines who 
had been employed for cutting and loading “proved most unreliable; no dependence could ever be 
placed on keeping them, for any moment when the fit seized them they would be , and frequently were, 
off without warning, leaving their employer in the lurch”. 
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Figure 2. Plantation Structure: Status and Authority 
(Saunders, 1982, p. 62) 
Companies such as CSR, offered “high wages and good quarters in an attempt to 
attract the most highly-qualified and temperamentally-suited men” (Saunders, 1982, 
p. 61), and estates were laid out in a way that enhanced racial and hierarchical 
divisions: 
Goondi Estate, for instance, was laid out around a parade ground where 
instructions were given to field labourers and ploughmen, inspections were 
conducted by the Inspector of Pacific Islanders and afternoon counts were 
appraised. The barracks for white and non-European workers would be situated 
near the parade ground, with the overseers’ and gangers’ houses in close 
proximity to these. CSR which designated its technical and managerial staff by 
the term “officers” appropriately accommodated them away from the workers 
(Saunders, 1982, p. 62).   
South Sea islanders were eventually limited to agricultural field work. It was 
estimated that the cost of bringing a labourer from a South Pacific island, a distance of 
900 miles, was £25 - £35 per head (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894c), and that it cost 
approximately £26 per year to keep each one, with wages (as set in the 1868 act) at £6 
per year, as well as rations, blankets, clothing, provisions, housing and medical 
treatment. Provisions were adequate, according to regulations: 
A Kanaka diet was well balanced, under Government Regulations, each 
man received daily 1 lb. beef or mutton, 1 lb of bread or flour, 5 ozs. 
sugar, 2 lbs. vegetables and 8 ozs. maize meal or 4 ozs. rice … they were 
also allowed to grow their own gardens. Sweet potatoes and bananas were 
the mainstay of the crops grown … If a man was ill, he was looked after 
in the Plantation hospital … Weekly they received 1 ½ oz. tobacco, 2 ozs. 
salt and 4 cakes of soap. Yearly they were supplied with 3 shirts, 4 pairs 
of trousers, a pair of blankets, a hat, shoes, pipes, matches and knives. In 
return the Kanaka worked a 10 hour day, starting early morning and 
finishing late afternoon (Robertson, 1991, p. 10).  
Even these simple arrangements caused controversy. Not all planters were happy with 
the “Kanaka gardens”, with one correspondent to the Editor of The Sugar Journal and 
Tropical Cultivator (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894d, p. 172) asserting that  
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… Kanakas’ “gardens” or farms have been causing a little stir here lately. 
I am curious to know if such “gardens” are allowed at Mackay, and if 
anything has been done to prevent or stop them. If we wish to see the next 
generation in this colony remain our own color, we ought certainly to now 
take decisive steps to prevent the alienation of our land to any colored 
races.  
In spite of these sentiments being held in certain quarters, the recruitment of South  
Sea island labour represented a significant investment for CSR, and it was in their 
interests to provide them with the kind of provisions, accommodation and medical 
care that ensured their good health and ability to perform the work for which they had 
been brought to the plantation. Consequently, at Goondi, they, together with other 
non-white labourers appear to have been well housed and cared for, as these excerpts 
from letters send to Goondi Mill from CSR’s head office in Sydney attest: 
Mr Smith tells me that he was much struck with the arrangement of the 
Kanaka houses at Goondi, and thinks we ought to adopt the same plan at 
Homebush. The difference in the sick-rate at the two places is certainly 
very striking, and Mr Smith says that, so far as the summer is concerned, 
he cannot account for this fact, except it is due to the way in which the 
men are housed (NBAC/N126/2, 18th May 1891).  
With regard to the Javanese, I suppose you have already planted the 
streets of their quarters with bananas, bamboos and cocoa nuts 
(NBAC/N126/2, 2nd September 1891).  
A constant supply of Islander labour, however, was not able to continue, as a result of 
the legislation already mentioned, which restricted, and then excluded, South Sea 
island labourers from working in the Australian sugar industry. Opinion seemed to 
turn against the employment of coloured labourers, and CSR found it more difficult to 
ensure a steady stream of workers to work in the fields and prepare the cane for the 
crushing season at the Goondi Mill. Since the economic operation of the mill was of 
primary importance, the company, well aware of public sentiment on the issue, 
experimented with various other strategies to overcome these difficulties, including 
the closure of the Victoria mill and its relocation to Fiji, and the recruitment of 
labourers from Java: 
(Strictly private) …  the Directors have come to the conclusion that 
Victoria (mill) should be closed at the end of the present year, but we have 
no intention that this decision should be made public until we have 
completed our arrangements for introducing Javanese … 
(NBAC/N126/92, 4th February 1891). 
… an early decision must be come to about the engagement of more 
labourers – presumably in Java, unless the Directors think 
A. that an attempt should be made to do the fieldwork at Victoria with 
Europeans, 
B. that it is undesirable to run counter to the public feeling in Queensland 
as to the introduction of coloured labourers, and that Victoria (mill) 
should be abandoned at the end of this year and the … plantations then 
worked to such an extent as might be possible with the labour force 
reduced from time to time as the contracts with the Kanakas expire 
(NBAC/N126/92 30th January 1891). 
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There is one point about which we are not quite clear and this is as to the 
possibility of engaging a number of the Kanakas whose time is expiring. 
Do you think it would be possible to induced any considerable proportion 
of them to reengage with us for one or more years if we offered them a 
much higher rate of wages than has hitherto been paid – say, from 15s/18s 
a week with board? – and if the best men would reengage could we count 
with any certainty on this rate of pay being earned and on the working 
expenses of the plantation not being unduly increased? In making this 
suggestion, I am assuming that a Kanaka who has served three years is, 
for agricultural work, equal to the average European – with this 
advantage, that he can cut the cane in the summer time when the 
Europeans are not able to do this class of work (NBAC/N126/92, 4th 
February 1891). 
Javanese: I was quite prepared to hear of the Queensland Parliament 
taking very little notice of the introduction of these men, for I am inclined 
to think that they are beginning to feel sorry for the sugar industry. I 
advised you as to the despatch of 84 men by the “Taroba” 
(NBAC/N126/2, 29th September 1891). 
As the expiry of the Polynesian Labor Act puts a stop to the introduction 
of Kanakas, it would appear that Java is the most likely place from 
whence to draw the laborers for our plantations; but, although no obstacles 
are at present raised by the Queensland Government to the introduction of 
Javanese, it is quite probable that steps will be taken sooner or later to 
stop these men being brought into the Colony, and it is therefore worth 
considering whether it would not be well to make arrangements at once to 
engage a sufficient number to enable us to carry on work at two of our 
plantations until the end of 1893, and possibly at one till the end of 1894, 
provided the engagement of the Javanese could be extended for six 
months beyond the usual three years (NBAC/N126/92, 30th January 
1891). 
As these labour shortages occurred, South Sea Islander labour increased in cost42 and 
became difficult to procure. In an attempt to curb increases in wages for Islanders, the 
Planters’ Association, in 1889, had recommended that such wages be limited to £6 per 
annum, with an additional £3 to be paid only if they were “sound working boys of 
good physique” (NBAC/N126/245, 30th April 1889). Further, it was recommended 
that “overtime Kanakas” (those who had already completed a term of engagement) be 
employed at a uniform rate of £12 per annum, or £15 where their return passage was 
already paid. These recommendations were “chiefly to avoid the irritation believed to 
have been caused in the minds of White Laborers by fluctuating and often high rates 
                                                 
42 One article claimed that “kanakas are asking and receiving £20 a year, with clothes and tobacco, and 
when wet weather, sickness, etc., has to be taken into consideration, they are proving very dear” (The 
Sugar Journal and Tropical Cultivator, 1894b, p. 106). In the same year, it was stated that in the last 
year of their agreement @ £16 - £18 p.a., “Kanakas” were now getting £26: “… the kanakas are quite 
alive to their value, and in my opinion understand the art of keeping up wages far better than white 
men” (The Sugar Journal and Tropical Cultivator, 1894e, pp. 82 – 83).  In addition to wages and 
supplies, from 1871, the Queensland government brought in a tax on Melanesians arriving in 
Queensland: started off at 10/- per recruit, to be paid by employers, and increased to 30/- per recruit 
from 1880 and up to ₤3 per recruit from 1885 (Shlomowitz, 1982, p. 51). 
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being offered Kanakas and thus even affecting their own rates” (NBAC/N126/245, 
30th April 1889).  
Because of labour issues, CSR made the decision to close its Victoria Mill in North 
Queensland, and relocate it in Fiji, where it was believed it would be more profitable 
to operate, given the ready supply of cheap labour there. Six monthly reports by CSR 
Ltd traced the progress of this venture, from the initial “testing” of the scheme in Fiji, 
already mentioned, to “satisfactory arrangements” being made with the Government 
of Fiji (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1890), to the decision to make the move and 
close the Victoria Mill (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1891). Always looking for 
opportunities to invest profitably, and to curtail potential losses, the directors at this 
time decided to dispose of “part of the arable land” at the Mackay mill to farmers, in 
order to find “some partial solution of the labour difficulty”, while at the Goondi mill, 
they were hopeful that they could “procure sufficient coloured labour to enable this to 
be worked for some years to come” (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1891).  
With these kinds of difficulties in acquiring cheap labour, Goondi Mill manager, C E 
Forster, as a member of the Planters Association, became involved, for a time, in a 
lobbying attempt to extend the 1885 Act so that South Sea Island labourers could be 
employed for an additional five years, until 31st December 1995. He attended an 
initial meeting of the Planters Association in Townsville on 29th April 1889 where it 
was decided to send delegates to Brisbane during the discussion of the report on the 
Sugar Commission, “with the object of assisting Members favourable to an extension 
of Kanaka Labor” (NBAC/N126/245). Mr Frank Neame, of Macknade Plantation at 
Dungeness, was elected President of the Board of Advice of the Planters Association, 
and worked hard to rally planters to the cause. In order to fund this “agitation”, a levy 
of 1/- per acre was made on “all growers of cane throughout the Colony” 
(NBAC/N126/245). CSR contributed an amount of £336/7/-, based on an acreage of 
6,727 acres, Mr Forster of Goondi remitting the amount in July 1889 
(NBAC/N126/245, 9th July 1889). Mr Neame put forward several possibilities for 
overcoming the shortage of labour, in a series of letters to Mr Forster during 1889 and 
1890, including the idea of introducing Italians43, in spite of the fact that the trade 
unions were “opposed to the introduction of cheap Europeans” (NBAC/N126/245, 
21st July 1890). Another of his suggestions was to import Japanese (NBAC/N126/245, 
14th October 1889): 
This (importing Japanese at a cost of about £5 per head and another £1 for 
getting them) would be a good solution to the question, if no objection 
were raised, but should we not have a great outcry among the trade unions 
through the colony Japanese would be looked on with as much aversion as 
Chinese. I think we should not yet despair of getting the act extended and 
that all our energies should be to endeavour to get the people with us, 
leaving any other class of labour as a last resort. 
The Act was extended, in 1892, but not before Mr Neame had expressed 
disappointment at the lack of financial support by all planters, and refunded part of 
the monies contributed, winding up the Board of Advice because their task was 
“generally considered hopeless”, and expressing the opinion that it was a “useless 
                                                 
43 Mr Neame expressed the opinion that introducing Italians might get the “working men” onside with 
the possible extension of the Act, because they would see competition against them as the “lesser of 
two evils”. He further commented on the “injustice of prohibiting the introduction of Kanakas … 
without this labour we don’t see how to carry on” (NBAC/N126/245, 4th March 1890). 
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expenditure to continue further agitation for the extension of the Polynesian Act” 
(NBAC/N126/245, 15th May 1890; NBAC/N126/245, 16th December 1890). Goondi 
Mill received an amount of £203/9/11, which was their share of the remainder after 
certain expenditure had been incurred on behalf of the planters (NBAC/N126/247, 
Date?). 
The restriction of the duties South Sea Islanders were allowed to perform according to 
the 1884 act was a frustration to plantation and mill owners. In 1890, CSR was 
charged with breaching the Pacific Islanders Act, by using Islanders to perform tasks 
that did not come within the classification of “field work” (NBAC/N126/247, 25th 
July 1890). The Islanders had apparently been involved in the unloading of a vessel, 
but legal advice provided by G A Roberts & Leu, Solicitors of Townsville, to the 
Manager of the Goondi Mill (NBAC/N126/245, 15th July 1890) was unclear, since 
there was some doubt about the actual nature of the work done. The Manager was 
advised to “call evidence at the hearing of the case to prove the Islanders had nothing 
to do with the steam-winch, and were not employed discharging the vessel”. The 
company was unsuccessful in pressing its case, and was fined the sum of £1, and 
ordered to pay £2/2/- costs (NBAC/N126/247, 25th July 1890). Correspondence from 
Edward Knox, General Manager of CSR, to Mr Forster advised “it is no use 
attempting to have the decision of the Bench reversed … we had better drop the 
appeal, public sympathy being against us” (NBAC/142/1457, 7th August 1890, pp. 
205 - 206).  
At this time pressure on labour was not just coming from the Government in the form 
of legislation, but from the trade unions. In Townsville44, “wharf labourers, foundry 
hands and railway workers formed the nucleus of a well-supported labour movement 
which soon contested the authority of the snug little junta of businessmen who ran the 
town hall” (Bolton, 2003, p. 10). The Australian Labor Federation was alert to 
practices at Goondi, and actively pursued CSR. One issue was the splitting of 
firewood, which CSR maintained was “field work”, but the Federation argued did not 
come within the Act. Edward Y Lowry, of the Federation’s Townsville District 
Council, communicated by letter with Mr Forster on 1st December 1890 about this 
matter: 
Sir. I have the honor to notify you, that it has come to my knowledge, a 
large quantity of firewood will be required to be cut and split for your 
plantation to enable you to carry on successfully business operations next 
year. Knowing full well that the employment of Kanakas in that direction 
is a direct contravention of the Polynesian Acts of 1884 and subsequent 
Amendment Acts, I trust that you will utilize some other class of labor for 
above purposes so as to avoid unnecessary friction (NBAC/N126/247). 
Mr Neame of the Planters’ Association expressed surprise that CSR should be “the 
first to be assaulted by the labour unions” as they employed “proportionately I 
suppose a larger amount of Europeans than on any other plantation” and were 
“generally acknowledged to treat them very well” (NBAC/N126/245, 9th December 
1890). He advised that “planters should shew a solid front and that an assault against 
one is equally against all” and advised that it would be well “to make a test case”. 
CSR obviously shared this view, as a further letter from the Australian Labour 
                                                 
44 Townsville, the “main entrepot” during the sugar boom, “naturally tended to favour the McIlwraith 
administration of 1879 – 1883, with its emphasis on developmental policies, lavish investment and 
tolerance of non-European labour” (Bolton, 2003, p. 5).  
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Federation’s Townsville District Council, dated 15th December 1890, expressed 
disapproval of Mr Forster’s “actions and treatment of our worthy delegate”: 
The Labor leaders are everywhere endeavouring to instill into the minds 
of toilors the one grand and noble gospel of doing to as they wish to be 
done by, and perhaps it would be as well for you and others in your 
position to consider what the consequences would be if “the measure with 
which you measure was meted to you again”. Trusting that time will 
bridge the gulf of inequality which now separates master from man …. 
(NBAC/N126/247). 
Even though Edward Knox, writing on 16th December 1890, advised Mr Forster that 
“we have not any intention of obeying the ‘order’ of the Labor Federation about not 
employing Kanakas for cutting firewood” (NBAC/142/1457), it became increasingly 
obvious that the institutional goal posts were shifting markedly during the 1890s: 
South Sea Islander labour was on the way out, the labour movement was growing in 
influence, and Australia was moving towards Federation and a White Australia 
policy. CSR had to deal with these changing labour patterns and re-orient its 
operations to accommodate these changes if it was to survive, but it had a history of 
“reading” the economic and political landscape and tailoring its practices to suit 
expectations. When it transferred the bulk of its operations to Queensland, 
… it immediately followed what was economically the most viable line 
and became the largest estate owner and importer of Kanakas in the 
colony, watching with jaundiced eye the efforts of a few small-holders to 
establish themselves … then quite suddenly the central factory idea 
reappeared in a new light – as a possible answer to the growing labour 
problem – and the company underwent a swift change of heart and 
reversed its attitude to the selector altogether (Docker, 1970, pp 210 – 
211).  
CSR’s response to these changes was determined, in part, by the accounting 
information generated at its various business operations and head office. With a 
policy of maintaining dividends to investors, profitability was of primary importance. 
Accounting for the cost of operations, including the cost of labour, figured as 
important, therefore, in providing information for decision making about the 
company’s future, maintaining the profitability it required, and fulfilling the 
accountability that it required of its various plantations and mills.  
5. Accounting at Goondi. 
The southern plantations of north America, already mentioned, relied on a 
sophisticated accounting system45, and CSR had a similar reliance, fuelled by its 
desire to achieve a profit acceptable to its investors. Thorough and accurate 
accounting was required, as part of a demanding system of accountability of mill 
managers and those who worked in management positions beneath them in the 
                                                 
45 Because of the “size and the scope of southern businesses”, it was necessary that “a sophisticated 
accounting system be utilized” (Flescher and Flescher, 1981, p. 124, cited in Heier, 1988, p. 132).  
“The Cotton Plantation Record and Account Book”, published around 1850, showed that record 
keeping procedures were “standard throughout Alabama and Mississippi during the antebellum period, 
and possibly standard throughout the cotton growing districts of the southern states” (Heier, 1988, p. 
147). Sugar planter William J. Minor of Mississippi and Louisiana, maintained what was described as 
“a detailed set of records … a hybrid accounting system, using elements of cash and accrual and single 
and double-entry bookkeeping” (Razek, 1985, p. 30). 
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organisational hierarchy. The annual review of the salaries of those in management 
positions took into account their performance in the preceding year, in terms of the 
cost of cane produced and the quality of the product, and the directions from the 
Sydney office about their salaries were very specific, as illustrated below: 
Mr. Stobo. His salary has been increased to £325 per annum as per 1 
January.  
Mr. Carnie. All things considered I think this officer is very well 
remunerated with his present salary. 
Mr. Mighell. To draw £200 per an. from 1 July provided, of course, that 
his work is satisfactory in the meantime. 
Mr. O’Kane. Salary increased to £150 at 1 January. 
Mr. Jenkins. Salary raised to £125 at 1st July next (NBAC/N126/92, 28th 
January 1891). 
The possibility of an increase in salary, or the threat of a decrease, as mentioned 
earlier in the case of Goondi’s mill manager, Mr C E Forster, 1891, was a forceful call 
to accountability and a considerable performance incentive at a time when South Sea 
Islanders were receiving £6 per annum and keep, and unskilled European workers 
received 20/- per week at the Goondi mill to work a 10 hour day, or a 12 hour day if 
required in the crushing season46.  
Part of the Goondi mill manager’s responsibilities included accounting, although there 
was a bookkeeper employed for that purpose. The intense and detailed supervision 
emanating from CSR’s Sydney office, resulted in comments such as those shown 
below:   
I must confess that the unexpectedly careless and neglectful manner in 
which the Goondi accounts lately received have been compiled, causes me 
to feel some uneasiness about the … bookkeeping at Homebush, from 
which mill we have hitherto received returns who are models of neatness 
and accuracy; and it may be good as well, at this stage, for you to tell Mr 
Highell that if he expects to receive the increase of salary, which has been 
conditionally promised him, it will be necessary for him to shew some 
improvement in the style of the 1890 Goondi a/cs (NBAC/N126/92, 5th 
March 1891). 
When I complained a month ago of the careless manner in which your 
accounts had been rendered I had in mind the discrepancies between the 
Cash A/c and the four weekly statement of Wages paid to Europeans and 
Chinese, the erroneous Polynesian return Statement … and other 
inaccuracies which called forth my telegrams of 11th, 16th, 18th and 23rd 
Feb and 2 March and letters of 11th, 17th, 18th and 23rd Feb. It is not 
pleasant for me to have to find fault with the work of any officer but the 
mistakes referred to should not have happened and occurring in the case 
of a distant mill, just when our time for making up the account is very 
limited. They were annoying (NBAC/N126/92, 2nd April 1891). 
                                                 
46 Charles Birnie, an unskilled labourer, was employed at Goondi from 10 February 1891 for a wage of 
20/- per week, as was John McNeill. A skilled worker such as a fitter could earn 12/- per day for a 58 
hour week, such as Geo. Chappel, appointed on 13 April 1887, or J’no May, a bricklayer, appointed on 
17th March 1891 (NBAC/N74/50-51). 
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I note in your weekly Wages Returns during the Slack Season that you 
have charged to Capital Accounts the work done on Intermediate Carrier. 
This is wrong: it should have been charged to Maintenance Machinery 
and I shall be glad if you will send me as soon as possible the number of 
days worked and the wages earned by Europeans and labor on this work, 
so that I may make the necessary alterations in our books. Per General 
Manager (NBAC/N126/2, 13th July 1891). 
Herewith is sent a circular in regard to the preparation of the new 
worksheets. At those mills where the sheets are not made out by the 
Chemist, this officer should supply the figures needed for the headings 
“Tons Sugar Branded”, “Tons Jelly Sugar Remitted”, “Net Tons Sugar 
Manufactured” and “Tons Branded Previous Season’s X” – he should also 
make the requisite calculations for the estimated tons … under the 
heading “Intermediate Products” … (NBAC/N126/2, 18th June 1891). 
CSR’s objective was to increase the yield of the cane-growing lands, and to increase 
both the quality and quantity of sugar from the mill, and there was no area outside the 
scrutiny of its head office or immune to counting and measuring, even to the usage 
and recording of manures used in fertilising and the digging of holes in which to plant 
cane: 
… By this mail you will receive 1 book and 12 sheets for the purposes of 
a daily journal on manures and 1 book and 8 sheets for half yearly reports 
on manures as well as 40 forms for statements on … actual yield of the 
cane crops. The books on Manures should be regularly kept and twice a 
year copies of the records therein sent to Sydney on the loose forms the 
first about the end of December or early in January and the second about 
June … these reports should be started with season 1889 following with 
season 1888 etc. and the report of each season should be sent to Sydney as 
soon as it has been finished … (NBAC/N126/2, 7th January 1891). 
With regard to digging large holes for cane, I can only say that your 
Kanakas remove just half the quantity of earth that a coolie does on 
similar soil in Fiji. You state that it takes £2 – or 12 Kanakas – per acre, 
say for 2000 holes, or 166 holes per man. 
Goondi  166 holes 20” X 10” X 10” = 7.1 cubic yards 
Fiji task  120 holes 24” X 20” X 12” = 14.8 cubic yards 
In my previous estimate I calculated one acre to contain 1782 holes … 
and 80 to be dug per day, or under 12 cubic yards per man = £3/13/4 p.a.  
(NBAC/N126/2 14th October 1891). 
… I am under the impression that we are much behind other sugar 
growing countries in the planting, and that we should take much more 
care with this operation than hitherto (NBAC/N126/2, 22nd September 
1891). 
Fleischman and Tyson (2000, p. 25) observed in a study of Hawaiian sugar 
plantations, that in the case of coloured labourers, there were no records on the 
performance of individual workers, i.e. “efficiency data were not necessary because 
they were irrelevant from the racial control perspective”. They drew attention to the 
fact that “wage rates were differentiated according to ethnicity”, and that “accounting 
served managerial elites by reinforcing these policies” (Fleischman and Tyson, 2000, 
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p. 28). There is no doubt this was the case from an individual point of view in the 
Queensland sugar industry, legislation having set the parameters for the use of South 
Sea Islander labour, and therefore, indirectly, the parameters for accounting for such 
labour. Certainly, as highlighted above, the names even of unskilled white labourers 
were listed in the Labour Register (NBAC/N74/50-51), and yet South Sea Island 
labourers were not distinguished between, but classed simply as a group, as 
demonstrated in Appendix 2, “Goondi Mill Labour Monthly Balances”.  It was when 
the wages they could command began to increase that distinctions were made within 
that class of labourers about those who were re-engaging or not, but it was on the 
basis of their group cost that decisions were made about their cost-effectiveness.  
Coloured labour was recorded separately from European labour, and ethnic groups 
were divided further into Coolie, Chinese, Fijian, Javanese, Japanese, Cingalese and 
Kanaka (NBAC/142/3566). It was held to be important that these categories be kept 
separate, as designated in the Mill accounts that were prepared each year47, and 
emphasized in the following correspondence from E W Knox in Sydney to C E 
Forster Esq at Goondi Mill: 
… With reference to your statement of Polynesians on Plantation on 31st 
Dec as shown on your Yearly return, you do not seem to understand what 
is required. We want the number of men of each ship with the date when 
their agreement expires, who are on the plantation on the 31st Dec 1890. It 
is impossible to work from your return as in 1889 you shew ex Eliza Mary 
86 Kanakas while in 1890 you show 101 whose time expired on Aug 21st 
1890. Kanakas ex Nautilus have increased from 33 in 1889 to 37 in 1890 
ex Fearless from 47 in 1889 to 59 in 1890 ex Para from 95 in 1889 to 105 
in 1890 and so on, in fact the Kanakas in each vessel shew an increase on 
the 1889 return. Please send a correct statement shewing the actual 
number on the Plantation, by return post as we cannot make up the 
accounts until this is done (NBAC/N126/2, 11th February 1891).  
… The information you give in regard to Kanaka labour will enable us 
now to prepare a statement shewing how we will stand at the end of 
December: this is to be submitted to the Board next Tuesday, when I hope 
the question of abandoning or continuing to work Victoria will be settled. 
So far as we have gone with this Statement it would appear that there is no 
chance of keeping the plant going, unless we introduce at least 200/300 
Javanese (NBAC/N126/2, 28th January 1891). 
For the particulars you said about the Kanakas I am obliged … herewith is 
returned your statement of expenditure during the slack season to have 
particulars filled in as to the Cingalese, Chinese and Kanaka labor so as to 
complete the statement, which please send back to me as early as possible 
(NBAC/N126/2, 21st January 1891). 
With reference to heading “Rations” in your four-weekly returns please, 
in future, divide into “Servants”, “Cooks for Kanakas”, “Cooks for 
Europeans”, “Baker”, “Storekeeper”, “receiving and delivering”, instead 
                                                 
47 Accounts were kept at Goondi for Cultivation, Cutters Wages, Fuel, General Charges, Chinese 
Labor, Kanaka Labor, Live Stock, Mill Wages, Rations, Maintenance of Plant, Working Expenses 
Sawmill, Working Expenses Tramways, Transport, and Wages (NBAC/N126/2, 17th March 1891). 
European wages were included under “Mill Wages”, but Chinese and “Kanaka” labour were recorded 
separately, in keeping with CSR practice. 
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of shewing all under the heading of “Rations” (NBAC/142/1456, 4th 
March 1890, p. 445).  
With reference to the estimate of the expenditure at your Mill between the 
seasons, I shall be glad if you will fill in on the forms sent under separate 
cover the names and pay of the men whom you propose to retain, and give 
in the separate columns the proportions of their wages which you expect 
to apply to the repair of each portion of the plant under your charge. The 
colored labor should be shown after the European, in the same manner as 
in your last slack season’s estimate. This return is wanted for comparison 
of the work done at the various Mills, and its preparation will enable you 
to estimate with greater accuracy the total expenditure which you wish to 
be authorized (NBAC/N126/2, 11th November 1891). 
With a goal of operating the mill as profitably as possible, to CSR directors, these 
detailed classifications were useful to ascertain and therefore control the cost of 
various tasks. The type of labour used had a significant bearing on many of the tasks 
that were labour-intensive, such as clearing, maintenance, and the cost of cutting 
cane: 
I think you have yet to show us that the clearing can be done at such a 
price that we might hope to get a fair return from our money, allowing for 
the fact that our tenure at Goondi is precarious … the cost of the work 
being excessive … I cannot call to mind that I have since received from 
you any statement indicating that the work can be done more cheaply, or 
that there was any justification for incurring the heavy expense involved 
(NBAC/142/1457, 16th December 1890, E W Knox to C E Forster). 
You speak of the grubbing costing £3 an acre, but is there any hope of its 
being kept down to this limit? (NBAC/142/1457, 16th December 1890, E 
W Knox to C E Forster). 
The cost of cutting the cane is certainly very high at Goondi. Mr Pope’s 
explanation of this is noted but at Homebush where they have also very 
light crops and fully 3 miles of horse-traction the cost is 3 ½ d per ton 
lower (NBAC/N126/2, 22nd September 1891, E W Knox to C E Forster). 
Strict records were kept of every aspect of production, and stringent measures were to 
be employed in increasing the yield of the plantation48, and in controlling 
expenditure49, in order to produce sugar at the lowest cost possible. Keeping these 
costs low contributed to the overall result of the mill, i.e. the cost of producing the 
sugar. Mr Forster was informed by a letter dated 17th March 1890 that “your sugar 
was, after all, produced at a moderate price, chiefly in consequence of the cost of 
kanaka labour being very low and through the percentage of workers being high” 
(NBAC/142/1457).  
                                                 
48 “The figure you give as the average yield of the whole plantation – 11 tons per acre – is truly a 
miserable return from such good land as that at Goondi … the yield should go up every year 
henceforward” (NBAC/N126/2, 16th December 1891, E W Knox to C E Forster at Goondi Mill). 
49 Even the amount of flour consumed at the various mills came under the scrutiny of E W Knox at 
CSR’s Sydney office: “… I may mention, however, in connection with the consumption of flour at 
Victoria that we did not see why this should be larger at that mill than at Goondi or Homebush” 
(NBAC/142/1457, 22nd April 1890, pp 39 – 40). 
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Comparisons were frequently made between the three north Queensland mills, as the 
following correspondence from E W Knox to C E Forster indicates: 
I was surprised to see from the last returns that there is still a very heavy 
expenditure for maintenance at Goondi which increases unduly the mill 
wages. For the past six weeks the average Expenditure has been 
Homebush    £9/19/6 
Victoria    £2/19/2 
Goondi    £20/19/11 
Were you running both mills at this top speed there might be some reason 
for this, but with one mill going at a moderate rate I cannot understand it 
especially as you tell us that there will be a very short crop next year and 
consequently only work for one pair of mills. This of course … urgently 
calls for your immediate attention (NBAC/N126/92, 23rd September 
1891). 
… with regard to Mill wages I find that the cost at Goondi has been very 
high, viz. £3864, while at Victoria £2977 was spent in a similar manner 
and at Homebush £1592, or per ton of cane worked 3.70s, 2.79s and 2.53 
s respectively. This difference is in a measure owing to more Europeans 
having been employed at the two former mills than at the latter, but still 
the charge appears abnormally high at Goondi (NBAC/142/1456, 1st May 
1899, p. 9). 
There is another question you should go into while at Victoria, and this is 
the extremely high maintenance charges: for the week ended 4th May the 
cost of the Europeans and coloured labour employed on maintenance there 
amounted to £50, and seeing that at Goondi and at Homebush for the same 
week the charges were respectively only £32 and £28, and that the plant at 
Victoria is reported by Mr Kidd to be in fair order, I do not understand 
how the expenditure should be so high (NBAC/142/1456, 20th May 1889, 
pp. 34 – 35). 
Table 1 “Maintenance of Plant and General Charges Comparative Statement” below, 
illustrates the kind of document that was prepared for the information of the mill 
managers, in order to inform them of the cost of their operations, and perhaps, subtly, 
to alert them to the importance of operating in as cost-effective a manner as possible. 
 
 Homebush Victoria Goondi 
 £ s d £ s d £ s d
Material for 
maintenance 
1948 16 9 1968 4 9 2599 4 10
Material for 
Manufacture 
401 3 7 581 8 11 435 5 3
Sundries 681 4 2 626 9 10 650 7 11
Wages 1178 5 8 1586 2 6 1588 17 -
Fuel *  179 13 8 135 7 -
 4209 10 2 4941 19 8 5409 2 -
 * £42 included in 
Material 
£202 in steamers and 
parts 
£78 on steamers and 
parts 
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Table 1. Maintenance of Plant and General Charges Comparative Statement 
(NBAC/142/1456, 15th March 1890, p. 477, E W Knox to C E Forster) 
The reality was that on the basis of the accounting numbers produced on the costs and 
consequent profitability of the various mills, any one of them might be closed if it 
were shown not to be operating as profitably as the others, labour costs being a 
significant factor in this calculation. A letter from E W Knox at Sydney to the Goondi 
manager dated 1st April 1890 (NBAC/142/1457) made a direct connection between 
keeping expenditure low and the possible removal of one of the mills to Fiji: 
I duly note your explanation of the higher expenditure in connection with 
manufacture at your mill as against Homebush … under these 
circumstances, and granted equally favourable seasons at the two places, it 
appears that we may look for the expenditure at Victoria being 18% 
higher than at Homebush and the crop 25% smaller: this is a result we 
were not prepared for, and the disadvantages under which Victoria labours 
… are hardly sufficient to account for the greater working expenses, while 
the smaller crop, even in a very favourable season, renders it desirable that 
the expenditure should be kept as low as possible. So far, therefore, as our 
experience goes at present it certainly points to the advisability of 
removing Victoria Mill and not Homebush, if we decide on employing the 
plant of one of the Queensland mills in Fiji. 
Accounting information on profitability of operations was used not only to hold mill 
managers accountable, but in the case of South Sea Islander labour, to make decisions 
at board level about the closure or continuation of a mill. Directors needed to know 
what cheap labour was available, in order to make such a decision. The following 
projection of the availability of coloured labour crucial to the running of the mill, 
shown in Table 2, “Estimates of Coloured Labour at Goondi 1991 to 1993”, 
illustrates the kind of planning that was undertaken at that level:   
 
1st Jany ’91 546 Kanakas 
To leave Jany/Sept 88 
 458 
To arrive Sept 400 Javanese 
To leave Oct/Dec176 Kanakas 
224 
 682 
Average available for ’91 crop say 700  
1st Jany ’92 682 
To leave Jany/June 97 
Available for ’92 crop 585 
1st Jany ’93 585 
To leave – Jany/July 168 
Available for ’93 crop 417 
To leave Dec ‘93 17 
 400 Javanese who if engaged by 31st 
Dec ’94 could take the crop off that 
year 
 
Table 2. Estimates of Coloured Labour at Goondi 1891 to 1893. 
(NBAC/N126/92, 30th January 1891) 
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Similar projections were made about the availability of coloured labour at Victoria 
and Homebush mills, and these were a factor in the decision to close Victoria mill and 
eventually break up the plantations and sell them off to local farmers.  
CSR recognized the shift in public opinion and the necessity for working within those 
constraints. New situations required changes and opened up new possibilities for 
profitable operations, and in recognizing and grasping hold of those possibilities, 
CSR’s strict and prescribed accounting system formed a large part of the system of 
accountability it demanded of those in management positions within the organization. 
The accounting employed was required to count and capture the precise cost of every 
aspect of the production process, including the employment of labour, to compare the 
various costs from year to year and between mills, and to use that accounting 
information to assist in making decisions, at board level, about the future operations 
of the company. Accounting systems set in place thus became “carriers” of the 
institutional beliefs current at the time about race and what was socially appropriate in 
the way South Sea Islanders were treated.   
6. Conclusions. 
All organizations operate within an institutional setting. The institutional environment 
for CSR as a sugar producer in north Queensland in the late 1800s included a culture 
of colonialism, legislation on South Sea Islander labour and public opinion on racial 
issues, played out against a backdrop of a turbulent world market for sugar and the 
physical difficulties of conducting an agricultural business in the tropics. It has been 
said that the sugar industry in Queensland has always been worked under “unusual 
and ‘unnatural’ conditions” because of its establishment with “imported Kanaka 
labour” (Brigden, 1932, p. 3). However we view this situation from the standpoint of 
the 21st century, it was the social context in which CSR operated in the late 1800s, and 
all these factors had to be taken into account if the company was strategically to 
manage its investment opportunities, achieve the dividend it desired for its investors, 
and maintain the high levels of accountability it required in order to achieve those 
goals.   
CSR’s accounting system, as part of its system of accountability, reflected the 
opinions and values of the day, as accounting systems usually do. They are a means 
by which social institutions are given visibility and maintained, as illustrated by the 
way in which South Sea Islanders were accounted for at Goondi mill, as a group 
rather than as individuals, and furthermore, as a group who were disadvantaged and 
discriminated against, whose wages were kept very low to serve the purposes of 
CSR’s investors. Kim’s (2004) observations about the entrenchment of racist attitudes 
through indentured labour and for socio-economic reasons, seem to be applicable in 
this case. Originally indentured because they were a cheap form a labour, South Sea 
Islanders were then ostracized because they competed, unfairly it was believed, 
against more expensive white labour. If the employment of indentured South Sea 
Islanders on the sugar plantations of north Queensland could be described as a system 
of “institutionalised exploitation and oppression” (Evans et al, 1975, p. 174), then 
accounting was certainly complicit in operationalising that system and perpetuating it.  
While the system of accounting employed was technically precise, could it be viewed 
as successful, or progressive? Napier (2001, pp. 16 - 17) challenged a purely technical 
interpretation of that notion, suggesting that our definition of progress depended on 
whether we viewed the “rationalisation of life” as a positive or negative aspect of 
calculative advancement. If, as Miller et al (1991, p. 401) suggested, “an unravelling 
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of the relations of power within which accounting is embedded, and which in turn it 
has helped to fabricate, is a worthwhile objective in its own right”, then we, as 
accountants, ought to look back and reflect on our history, however challenging it 
may be in the light of the current pressure on our profession because of accounting’s 
role in spectacular corporate collapses50.   
The story of CSR and its mill at Goondi, and the way labour was accounted for is very 
interesting, but what is more interesting and challenging for us as accounting 
historians is to reflect on the way in which economic arguments were mounted, based 
on accounting and notions of profitability, to perpetuate an institutionalised system of 
exploitation. The notions that white men could not work in the tropics, that the sugar 
industry ought to be established and succeed in Queensland for the economic good of 
its people, and that this could never happen without cheap coloured labour, were all 
proven to be at best debatable and at worst, incorrect and oppressive. Yet at the time, 
accounting reflected those views.  
As accounting historians, we are well placed to recognize the power of accounting in 
perpetuating injustices and mobilizing economic arguments, which are later proved to 
be misfounded and misguided. What social institutions are we, as accountants, 
accepting without question and perpetuating today? 
Postscript. 
In 1994, the Australian Federal Government recognized South Sea 
Islanders as a community, and on 9 September 2000, 400 Australian 
South Sea Islanders took part in a recognition ceremony at Queensland 
Parliament House. The Queensland government Recognition Statement, 
made at that time, “acknowledged past injustices, discrimination, social 
disadvantage and racial prejudice”, and stated that “the Queensland 
Government hereby formally recognises Australian South Sea Islanders 
as a distinct cultural group” (Brändle, 2001, p. 38).  
                                                 
50 Miller et al (1991, p. 401) “tentatively” suggested that “those periods when a discipline comes to 
vigorously scrutinize its own past tend to be periods when the discipline itself is undergoing significant 
transformations, is under pressure or approaching a state of crisis”.  
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Appendix 1. Queensland and Commonwealth legislation relating to the employment of Pacific Islanders  
 
Year Legislation Summary and Comments 
1862 Coolie Act (Queensland) This legislation “cleared the way for the importation of ‘coloured’ workers to the colony” of Queensland 
(Frost, 1996, p. 133). Originally they were to be Indians, introduced by the government (Irving, 1980, p. 
152) but when that scheme failed, Melanesian labourers were imported instead.  
1867 Aliens Act (Queensland) British naturalisation became “accessible” within six months to “any alien being a native of a European or 
North American state and not being an enemy alien” (Brändle, 2001, p. 2), but South Sea Islanders were 
restricted by their race from becoming naturalised as British citizens. 
1868 Polynesian Labourers Act 
(Queensland) 
This act provided for the licensing of recruiting ships, and regulations to be adhered to. It was “the first 
(Act) to try to govern the many abuses in recruiting from the Islanders and the treatment of the Islanders  in 
Queensland” (Moore, 1974, p. 33). Wages for indentured labourers were set at a minimum of £6 per year 
for a 3-year contract, Islanders were to be provided with housing, food rations, clothing, blankets and 
medical treatment (Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 2), and to be repatriated at the end of their contracts (Irvine, 
1980, p. 153). 
1877 Polynesian Labourers Act 
Amendment Bill 
(Queensland) 
This Bill prohibited employment of south sea islanders more than 30 miles from the coast. It was not 
passed, but regulations were introduced that had the same effect: “ … After charges that they were 
depriving Europeans of jobs on the (pastoral) stations, their (South Sea Islanders) employment was 
confined to coastal districts” (Frost, 1996, p. 133).  
1880 Pacific Islanders Labourers 
Act (Queensland) 
A revision of the 1868 Act, and the amendments that had followed. It was not as significant as the 1884 Act 
(Pacific Island Labourers Act Amendment Act 1884). One of its provisions was for a fine of between ₤5 and 
₤20 for “failure to provide medicine and attention when a Melanesian was ill” (Saunders, 1982, p. 89). It 
had become obvious that planters could “profit by the death of a Melanesian by keeping accrued wages, 
which were often paid only at the termination of the three-year indenture” (Saunders, 1982, p. 89), and 
medical treatment had been grossly inadequate in some cases.   
1884 Pacific Island Labourers’ 
Amendment Act 
(Queensland) 
Islanders were to be employed only in “tropical or semi-tropical agriculture”, which excluded other trades 
and domestic or household services (Parnaby, 1964, p. 128; Frost, 1996, p. 134).  
1884 Sugar Works Guarantee Act This Act facilitated “the settlement of small farmers as opposed to the big homestead purchases of the past” 
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(Queensland) (Moore, 1974, p. 39). 
1885 Central Mill Act 
(Queensland) 
The first of these acts provided that the Government was to contribute the sum of £50,000 towards the 
establishment of co-operatively owned mills (Frost, 1996, p. 137). 
1885 Pacific Island Labourers’ 
Amendment Act 
(Queensland) 
“After the thirty-first day of December 1890, no licence to introduce Islanders shall be granted … five years 
would give the planters ample time to make new arrangements” (Docker, 1970, p. 226). This legislation 
“excluded further migration of Pacific Island labourers into Queensland” (Moore, 1974, p. 39). 
1892 Pacific Islanders’ Extension 
Act (Queensland) 
This Act extended the period when South Sea Islanders could work in Asutralia by five years. It also 
excluded South Sea Islanders from working in refineries and doing ploughing (The Call for Recognition, 
1992, p. 14) 
1893 Sugar Works Guarantee Act 
(Queensland) 
The Parliament used a sum of £50 000 for the purpose of erecting “two or more central factories which 
were to be owned, after the Government had been repaid, by the farmers who grew cane for them”, on the 
condition that only European labour be employed in the mills or the fields (ASIM/The Sugar Journal and 
Tropical Cultivator, 1894, pp. 237 – 238). This Act “… authorized the financing of a large number of 
central mills through Government debentures … a terrific impetus to the growth of small holdings” 
(Docker, 1970, p. 260). 
1901  Pacific Island Labourers Act 
(Commonwealth) 
Described as one of the “darker aspects of Federation” (Sugar Heritage News, 2000, p. 2), the White 
Australia policy required the end of recruitment from 31 March 1904, and deportation of all South Sea 
Islanders by 31 December 1906, except ticket holders and those born in Australia, “a select 1,500 – 2,000 
long-time residents” (Frost, 1996, p. 134). 
1901 Immigration Restriction Act 
(Commonwealth) 
Aimed at excluding all non-European migrants, its sentiments were in line with “Australian nationalism in 
the late 1880s and 1890s”, and the mechanism, while not overtly racial, was a “Dictation Test”, to be 
administered to “any immigrant during the first year of residence”. It was initially to be a 50-word dictation 
passage in “a European language” but this was changed in 1905 to “any prescribed language” (Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901). 
1906  Pacific Island Labourers 
Amendment Act 
Following a political campaign by Pacific Islanders to oppose the 1901 Act, the 1906 amendment act 
merely “liberalised the exemption categories” and deportation was complete by mid 1908, with around 
2500 Pacific Islanders remaining in Australia, about 1,000 more than would have been permitted to stay 
under the original 1901 Act (Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901).  
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Appendix 2. Goondi Mill Labour Monthly Balances 
(Source: NBAC/142/3566. Sugar Mills monthly balances. CSR Co Ltd 1896 – 1902) 
DEBITS 
 
Month Coolie Chinese Fijian Javanese Japanese Cingalese Kanaka Supplies 
31 Oct 1896    289 9 6    311 17 8 943 - 7    6525 18 10 276 - 7 
30 Nov 1896    323 15 11    355 - 10 1185 1 7    6525 18 10 302 7 7 
31 Dec 1896    421 6 4    477 5 10 1507 15 2    7767 13 5 382 7 8 
Close of 
season 1896 
            587 13 9    3510 16 4 109 19 3 
31 March 
1897 
   53 8 10    1 - - 725 14 5    3777 13 - 111 16 1 
30 April 
1897 
   98 19 1    1 - - 824 2 6    3777 13 - 130 3 11 
31 May 1897    98 19 1    1 - - 828 - 1    3781 13 4 219 11 - 
30 June 1897    202 10 10    1 - - 1105 17 1    3825 9 1 322 13 9 
31 July 1897    246 9 7    1 - - 1303 8 10    4935 19 7 322 3 - 
31 August 
1897 
   300 5 3    1 - - 1333 15 2    6274 - - 348 15 2 
30 
September 
1897 
   346 19 1    1 - - 1436 5 7    6320 14 9 348 15 2 
31 October 
1897 
   389 10 11    1 - - 1555 5 4    6284 13 6 348 15 2 
30 Nov 1897    431 2 11    1 - - 1672 11 10    6296 15 2 372 16 1 
31 Dec 1897    543 - 5    1 - - 2178 - 1    7319 19 2 466 16 1 
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